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ABSTRACT 
This study uses a linear programming model of a representative state farm in the 
region Karakalpakstan in the republic ofUzbekistan to evaluate how producer incentives and 
cropping patterns may change given both changes in state pricing policy and changes in the 
availability and cost of irrigation water. 
Cotton has long been the dominant crop in this area, and Uzbekistan is currently the 
world's second largest exporter. Cotton production has expanded tremendously over the past 
30 years almost entirely through the extension ofvery large state sponsored irrigation 
projects. However, despite large investments and production increases, productivity and 
efficiency remain low. Agriculture in the region is characterized by state control at all levels 
of agricultural production, while extensive cotton monocropping has created a myriad of 
environmental problems that have attracted international attention. Should policy reforms be 
implemented in the form of the removal of state controls together with changes in water 
management, it is likely that relative incentives for the production ofmajor crops would 
change significantly. 
There are two primary objectives of this paper. First is an evaluation ofhow 
production incentives for different crops change as state intervention in the agricultural sector 
is reduced and/or eliminated. Second, the study evaluates how producer incentives change 
based on different assumptions about the availability and cost of irrigation water which at 
present is provided free of charge. 
Results indicate that if state interventions were to be reduced, there would not 
necessarily be a significant change in cropping patterns from those currently practiced. 
However, a supply function for cotton output is generated and shows an elasticity consistently 
greater than one indicating that, at least according to model parameters, area planted to cotton 
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is highly responsive to changes in output price. Results also demonstrate that the elimination 
of state intervention may not result in an increase in farm income which indicates that taxes 
extracted from the sector in the form of low prices for farm output are, at least to a first order 
of approximation, offset by subsidies for other farm inputs which occur mostly in the form of 
no fee for irrigation water. Model results also demonstrate that changes in water availability 
have a significant impact on the optimal cropping pattern. With large quantities of water 
available rice production is favored. However, with reduced quantities of water, the optimal 
cropping pattern quickly shifts away from rice toward other less water consumptive crops. 
Model results also indicate that the marginal value product of water is significantly positive, 
indicating that implementing fees would not necessarily cause producers to alter existing 
cropping patterns. A version ofRybczinski's theorem is shown to hold for the relation 
between water availability and there area planted to water intensive crops. 
-

Introduction 
The autonomous region ofKarakalpakstan covers an area of2.5 million ha. and lies in 
the northwest region ofUzbekistan. The region contains the southern border of the Aral Sea, 
and the AInu Darya river delta. Ofthis 2.5 million ha. of total land, only 312,000 ha. is 
arable, resulting in a land availability of .28 ha. per capita. Rainfall in the region averages 
approximately 300 mm per annum and as a result nearly all agriculture is dependent on 
irrigation. The region is the poorest in the Republic and largely lags behind other regions of 
Uzbekistan in terms of social and economic indicators. Karakalpakstan is also the region of 
Uzbekistan that has been hardest hit by the environmental catastrophe of the drying up of the 
Aral Sea. This environmental disaster has been a calamity for the people of the region both in 
terms ofpublic health and in terms of threatening the future of agriculture. 
Agricultural production in Karakalpakstan has expanded tremendously over the past 
30 years almost entirely by the transformation of desert regions into arable lands through the 
extension of state sponsored irrigation projects. However, despite large investments and 
production increases, productivity and efficiency for agriculture remain low, with virtually all 
growth coming from area expansion and not yield improvements. Moreover, extensive cotton 
monocropping has created a myriad of environmental calamities that have attracted 
international attention. 
Agriculture in the region is characterized by a very large degree of state control at all 
levels of agricultural production and marketing and operates in much the same way it did prior 
to the breakup of the USSR. However, should market oriented reforms be implemented in the 
sector it is possible that relative incentives for the production ofmajor crops would change 
significantly. This paper will provide a survey ofthe major policies affecting agriculture and 
land use in Karakalpakstan and will use a linear programming model of a representative state 
farm to evaluate how changes in economic and environmental policy would affect incentives 
for farm producers. 
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Table 1. Agricultural Land Use in Karakalpakstan: 
Percent orLand Area by Crop 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
 
Lint Cotton 52.2 49.6 49.4 46.9 49.9 47.0 
Grains Total 39.1 42.2 44.1 46.8 43.3 46.4
 
Rice 31.0 33.9 33.3 29.9 31.6 32.1
 
Wheat 2.7 3.0 5.0 12.7 6.8 10.9
 
Other Grains 5.4 5.3 5.8 4.2 4.9 3.4
 
Potatoes 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 
Vegetables 2.4 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.8 2.6 
Melons 4.6 3.8 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 
Fruits 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 
Grapes 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Total Fruits and 8.1 7.6 6.0 5.7 6.1 5.9 
Vegetables 
Source: Karakalpakstan Ministry of Agriculture 
The Agricultural Sector in Karakalpakstan 
Table 1 shows arable land use patterns in Karakalpakstan since independence. It is 
evident from the table that land use is dominated by the production of cotton and graincrops. 
Since 1991, the total area devoted to cotton decreased slightly from 52.2% to 47% of total 
land area. However, the area devoted to wheat increased from 2.7% in 1991 to 10.9% of total 
land area as a result of an effort on the part of the central government to achieve food grain 
self sufficiency. Under the soviet structure, nearly all grain needs for the republic were 
supplied by neighboring Kazakstan and Russia. Since independence however, government 
policy has explicitly focused on increasing land areas devoted to grain production for the 
­
purpose of reducing if not eliminating food grain imports. This increase has been more 
substantial in other parts of the country but it is nevertheless evident that part of the 
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responsibility of achieving food grain self sufficiency has fallen on Karakalpakstan. The 
question of the efficacy of this policy is not the focus of this study. Nevertheless it is quite 
likely that as Uzbekistan's comparative advantage lies in cotton production, greater levels of 
aggregate income could be achieved were Uzbekistan to concentrate on cotton production and 
import wheat from Kazakstan which holds a comparative advantage in grain production. 
Fruit and vegetable production has remained relatively constant during the period. 
While fruits and vegetables occupied just under 6% of total land area in 1996, this sector 
represents an important component of agricultural production due to the high value of these 
privately marketed crops. Many observers have noted that expanded production of 
horticultural crops could prove very useful in enabling Uzbekistan to diversify its mix of 
exports and help to relieve its great dependence on cotton as its main export commodity. 
Significant export markets for fresh market fruits and vegetables may exist for 
Uzbekistan in Russia and other parts of the Former Soviet Union. However, given the 
significant distances and transportation costs, it is unlikely that Uzbekistan is presently in any 
position to compete in Western European markets with other traditional fresh fruit exporters 
such as Israel and Turkey. These competing countries have relatively lower transport costs 
and more experience with Western quality control requirements. Over the medium term, it is 
likely that Russia and other neighboring republics will constitute the most viable export 
market for Uzbek horticultural products. 
Nearly all cotton grown in Karakalpakstan and Uzbekistan is exported as raw cotton. 
Prior to independence, cotton textile manufacture was performed in other parts of the Soviet 
Union, but since independence planners have expressed interest in developing domestic textile 
industries. While a small number of textile facilities have been constructed during the past 
five years, investment in these industries has not been sufficient to have a significant impact 
on the structure ofthe sector and it is likely to take some time for Uzbekistan to achieve the 
-
levels of consistency and quality required by the international market. Accordingly, for the 
time being Uzbekistan must look to the world raw cotton market for export earnings, while 
using domestic textile production to satisfy internal demand. 
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Crop yields in Karakalpakstan are generally lower than in other parts of Uzbekistan, 
and are substantially lower than in other parts of the world. As can be seen in Table 2, crop 
Table 2. Average Crop Yields for Cotton, Rice, and Wheat 1994-1996 (tons/ha) 
Karakalpakstan Uzbekistan Egypt Turkey India 
Seed Cotton 2.1 2.5 2.6 2.8 .9 
Rice 1.8 3.1 7.9 5.1 2.9 
Wheat 1.2 1.3 5.2 1.9 2.4 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture Karakalpakstan; FAO Production Yearbook 
yields for cotton in Karakalpakstan have averaged 2.1 tons/ha. over the past 3 years in contrast 
to 2.5 tons/ha. for the rest of Uzbekistan. Lint quality notwithstanding, yields in Uzbekistan 
compare rather favorably to those in Egypt and Turkey and are considerably more favorable 
than those in India over this period. Rice production in Karakalpakstan suffers from very low 
yields, though since very little rice is grown in other parts ofUzbekistan it is not useful to 
make a comparison between the two. We can see however, that rice yields in Karakalpakstan 
are considerably lower than other producing nations who are at a similar stage of development 
and who face similar agroc1imatic conditions. Similarly, yields for wheat also lag far behind 
those obtained in the compared countries. 
Low yields for these major crops are partly due to the generally low levels of 
productivity that were prevalent in all soviet agriculture. However, it should also partly be 
attributed to the environmental degradation resulting from deterioration in water quality and 
the drying up of the Aral Sea. It is expected that substantial improvements could be made to 
the agricultural system in terms of productivity should questions of water quality be resolved, 
-

and effective reforms be made to improve producer incentives. 
4
 
Irrigation Management 
Perhaps no other resource is as critical and constraining a factor for agriculture in 
Karakalpakstan as water. In the absence of irrigation water little if any agricultural activity is 
possible. At present over 90% of cultivated land in Karakalpakstan is irrigated. Farmers, 
farm directors and ministry officials repeatedly point to the critical importance of water for 
agriculture. "With water we can have everything; without water there will be nothing" stated 
one state farm director. In a more drastic tone another remarked, "We need water more than 
we need air". 
Irrigation management is controlled by the Ministry of Agriculture and Water 
Resources, which determines the level and flow rate of water in main and interfarm canals at 
the regional level. State farms are responsible for the maintenance of on-farm irrigation and 
drainage canals. It is important to note that there is no direct economic relationship between 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources and state farms and other agricultural 
producers. Expenses for the supply of irrigation water and for the maintenance of irrigation 
infrastructure are covered through budgetary allocations of the central government. Producers 
use irrigation water as needed without regard to its cost. This has been a major factor for the 
grossly inefficient water use strategies employed by producers, and explains the very large 
quantities of irrigation water used on crops in Uzbekistan. Table 3 shows typical water use 
rates in Uzbekistan compared to water use for cotton in other countries with similar 
agroecological conditions. 
Table 3. Irrigation Water Use for Cotton: Selected Countries 
Uzbekistan Syria Egypt California 
-

Water Use 12.8 7.4 8.5 9.2 
1,000m3/ha. 
kg lintJl 000m3 64.4 152.6 124.4 160.1 
water 
"Land and Water Policies in Uzbekistan", Lerman, Garcia-Garcia, and Wichelns 
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It is clear that the intensity of water use for cotton in Uzbekistan is considerably 
greater than in other regions while the productivity of irrigation water with respect to its 
contribution to yield is considerably lower. Excessive application of irrigation water has led 
to severe soil salinization, a problem which has been greatly exacerbated by the poor quality 
of drainage infrastructure on farms as well as generally shallow groundwater tables which in 
many areas lie only 2-3 meters below the soil surface. Soil salinization has become such a 
problem in many areas that producers have adopted the strategy of attempting to 'wash' the 
soil prior to planting. Large quantities of irrigation water are applied at the beginning of the 
growing season in order flush salts down and away from the root horizon. Subsequently 
irrigation water is applied sparingly in order that the crop may have sufficient water 
throughout the growing season. However, it effectively becomes a race against time for many 
producers to obtain a harvestable crop before the irrigation water percolating down into the 
soil facilitates the return of salts back up to the root horizon where it then becomes a major 
hindrance to plant development. 
It is not certain how long such a production practice can be maintained. Moreover, it 
is also not clear that there is a direct solution to this problem of soil and water salinization'. 
Most of the salts contained in irrigation water coming to Karakalpakstan are contracted as 
runoff from farms in upstream regions. Barring a major change in cropping and irrigation 
management practices on the part of upstream producers, it is unlikely that the quality of 
irrigation water flowing to Karakalpakstan will change significantly. Moreover, on this point 
it should be noted that much of the salts in the irrigation water reaching Karakalpakstan are 
not from agrochemicals, but from salts dissolved into irrigation water which occur naturally in 
the soils upstream. Hence, a simple reduction in the use of agrochemicals will not have the 
-

result of reducing salt levels in water reaching Karakalpakstan. Only a drastic reduction in the 
use of irrigation water upstream would have a measurable impact on the quality ofwater 
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reaching Karakalpakstan, and this would still not resolve the issue of salinization occurring 
from salts contained in the soil in Karakalpakstan itself. 
However, despite the fact that soil salinization will continue to plague producers in 
Karakalpakstan, there are nevertheless a number of actions that could be taken that would 
ameliorate this problem at least somewhat. The first would be to switch to crops with lower 
water requirements. Both of the main crops presently grown in Karakalpakstan, cotton and 
rice, generally use significant quantities of irrigation water. A switch to orchards and other 
crops with lower water requirements could serve to significantly improve upon this problem. 
Also, while large investments have been made in the development of irrigation canals, 
there has not always been a corollary investment in drainage infrastructure. It is clear that 
lack of drainage canal infrastructure has contributed significantly to the problem of both soil 
salinization and deterioration of soil productivity. Indeed, in the fields of many state farms 
there is no drainage system in place at all. Hence all water applied necessarily will percolate 
down into the soil and result in the return of salts back to the soil surface. 
It should also be noted that under the current policy environment, ownership of land is 
nonexistent and property rights and responsibilities for stewardship of land are poorly defined. 
As such there is little if any incentive for state farm workers to maintain on-farm canal 
infrastructure. Certainly farm workers are ostensibly responsible, but as returns to this 
activity do not accrue directly to the agent that makes this investment in terms of labor, there 
is little incentive for farm workers to devote great efforts to ensure that drainage systems are 
operating effectively. 
Another important factor that needs to be considered is that since there is no charge for 
the use of irrigation water, there is little incentive to economize or use water efficiently. In 
fact in Uzbekistan water is viewed as a free good that should not require payment. This 
attitude was promoted by soviet state structures which lauded their ability to provide water ­
and other public utilities at no cost to the user. As a result of these historical experiences, 
there are significant cultural and social forces in place that work against the implementation of 
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fee structures for the use of irrigation water. It should be noted however, fees for water were 
in fact a characteristic of agriculture in Central Asia prior to soviet control. Nevertheless for 
future planning purposes, due in no small part to the legacy of soviet control, any water policy 
reform strategy which attempts to redefine economic relationships between costs and user will 
invariably have to take these social factors into consideration. 
A Model of Land Use in Karakalpakstan 
This study uses a linear programming (LP) model for a representative state farm to 
evaluate changes in producer incentives resulting from reforms in agricultural and 
environmental policy. As state farms in Karakalpakstan tend to be relatively homogeneous, a 
representative farm model is a useful analytical framework with which to model these policy 
changes. Given the small degree of variability between state farms, results obtained from the 
representative farm model can reasonably be applied to develop hypotheses regarding 
incentive structures in the agricultural sector as a whole. 
.The primary questions that this linear programming model serves to evaluate are: 
a)	 How would cropping decisions change if the current state run system were liberalized 
and farmers faced market prices for inputs and output? 
b)	 How would optimal cropping allocations change based on different assumptions about 
the cost and availability of irrigation water? 
The model maximizes net farm income subject to constraints of land, labor, water and 
capital availability. A series of farm budgets were constructed for all crops included in the 
model using both observed domestic prices and border price estimates for farm inputs and 
-

output. Each farm budget represents the return generated by that crop on a per hectare basis. 
Crops included in the model include cotton, rice, winter wheat, spring wheat, alfalfa, maize, 
8
 
melons, and tomatoes. For all crops, variable costs were subtracted from total revenues to 
obtain an estimate of net income per unit ofland for that crop. 
Total revenue in the farm budget consists of the output price of the crop multiplied by 
the expected yield on a per hectare basis. In some instances the sale of the byproduct ofthe 
crop was also included in the revenue component of the farm budget. Variable costs consist 
of seed, fertilizer, manure, machinery, irrigation water, and labor. The price of the input was 
multiplied by the quantity used on a per hectare basis to obtain an expense estimate per 
hectare for that input. 
Domestic Price vs. Border Price Farm Budgets 
The farm budgets for all crops in the model have been estimated using both current 
domestic prices and border price estimates. A farm budget which uses border prices gives an 
indication of-what the relative profitability of different crops would be in the absence of state 
intervention in input and output markets. Presently, the ~tate supplies farm inputs at 
controlled prices and maintains procurement orders for many agricultural commodities at a 
price which differs substantially from prices that prevail on world markets or in neighboring 
countries. A farm budget that uses border price estimates for farm inputs and output can be 
used to evaluate the relative profitability of different crops in the absence of price distortions. 
This provides an indication of how production incentives are likely to change with a lower 
degree of state intervention in the agricultural sector. 
The border price of a good is equal to the world price of that good adjusted for 
transportation and marketing costs. If the good is imported, then the border price is equal to 
the world price of the good plus the transport and marketing margins involved in getting it to 
-

the farm gate, while if it is exported, the border price is the world market price of that good 
less the transport and marketing costs involved in getting the good to the farmgate. For an 
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exported tradable such as cotton in Karakalpakstan, this is effectively an estimate of the 
farmgate price that a producer would receive in the absence of any price distortions or state 
intervention in the market. For potentially imported goods such as wheat, border prices are 
derived from the selling prices of potential suppliers (e.g. Kazakstan) with the addition of 
associated transport costs. The border price thus represents an efficiency benchmark which 
can be contrasted with existing domestic prices to establish whether producers are receiving a 
tax or a subsidy in the price of different elements of their farm inputs and output. 
A shadow price represents an estimate of the opportunity cost of a good that is not 
tradable. It is an estimate of the value of the good inits next best alternative use. For 
instance, in the context of Karakalpakstan, water is a nontraded farm input with an observed 
on farm price of zero. However, ifwe gather information as to the costs involved to provide 
irrigation water, it is possible to estimate a shadow value for the use of that input. 
All data for this study were obtained during a visit to Uzbekistan in the Spring and 
Summer of 1997. The methodology for data collection consisted of numerous interviews with 
state officials in the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources and other relevant 
ministries. On farm data was obtained through a series of visits to 17 different farms where 
directors, managers and state farm workers were queried with regard to their cropping 
practices, resource endowments and marketing arrangements. Lastly, this study also relies on 
secondary data obtained from other technical assistance projects whose work pertains to the 
Uzbek agricultural sector. 
Data for seed application rates and prices, both domestic and border, were obtained 
through field interviews and through secondary data sources. Fertilizer prices and application 
rates were obtained through discussions with the state agrochemical supplier 
Uzagrochemservice and on farm interviews. The border prices for fertilizers were taken from 
-

'Commodity Markets and the Developing Countries' published by the World Bank. For 
machinery costs, and hourly cost ofoperation was derived for both heavy caterpillar and light 
10
 
wheeled tractors, as well as fann implements and harvesting machinery. Hourly cost of 
operation was dependent upon the purchase price, the estimated useful life of the machine, the 
cost of capital, and the fuel requirements for the machine for each operation. Infonnation 
regarding machinery requirements by crop was also obtained from field interviews and 
secondary data sources. 
Data concerning water requirements for each crop was obtained through discussions 
with the state water research institute SANIIRI and interviews with state fann managers. The 
shadow price of water of$3.33 per 1,000 cubic meters was the unit cost which SANIIRI 
estimated would be needed to cover state expenditures for the provision of irrigation water. 
Estimates for labor requirements were taken as an average of field interviews and secondary 
data sources. The wage rate was taken as the average wage rate at the time of field interviews. 
Data for yield and output price data was taken as a result of interviews with state fann 
management and data provided by the Ministry of Agriculture. Border price estimates for 
major traded commodities such as cotton and grains were taken from "Commodity Markets 
and the Developing Countries with transportation and processing cost estimates included. 
Border price estimates for other commodities were taken from secondary sources. 
Lastly, all price data for fann budgets was initially collected in the Uzbek currency 
som. It was then converted at the official state exchange rate prevailing in July 1997 of 61 
som/$. To establish the shadow price of nontradables such as labor, these inputs were 
. converted to a dollar value at the estimated shadow exchange rate of 100 som/$. 
Description of Representative Farm and 
Construction of the Linear Programming Model 
The programming model maximizes net fann income subject to the constraints of 
-

land, labor, water, and capital. The complete programming model with a glossary of notation 
for all variables using domestic prices is contained in Appendix A. The objective function of 
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the linear programming model contains the total revenue obtained for each crop. It also 
contains values for the costs associated with fertilizer and machinery expenses. Labor and 
water were included as constraints in the initial formulation of the model. This was done 
initially to use the linear programming model to derive dual values for these farm inputs by 
varying labor and water availability. However, these inputs are included as objective function 
coefficients in subsequent formulations of the model in order to test different assumptions 
regarding the relative cost ofthese inputs. 
Technical requirements for crops such as the estimated number of labor days, quantity 
of irrigation water, and hourly machinery requirements were placed as technical coefficients 
in the constraint section of the model. In the case oflabor and water, the supply available for 
these resources was divided into monthly periods given the seasonal nature of their use and 
availability. For other resources such as fertilizer and machinery this was not necessary since 
availability is relatively constant through the year. 
Description of The Representative Farm 
A summary of the general characteristics and parameters of the representative farm are 
contained in Table 3. The farm has 1500 hectares of irrigated land. In the initial formulation, 
there are 48,000,000 cubic meters of water available to the farm over the course of the 
growing season. Water availability is divided up by month, and monthly water requirements 
by crop are placed as technical coefficients in different period constraints of the model. 
Table 3 Parameters of Representative Farm 
-

Arable Land 
Water Available (initial) 
1,500 hectares 
48,000,000 m3 
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Labor 550 workers at 22 work days/month 
Machinery 25 Altai Caterpillar tractors 
40 MTZ 80 Wheeled Tractors 
20 Harvester Combines 
Crop Selection Cotton, Rice, Spring Wheat, Winter 
Wheat, Alfalfa, Maize, Melons, and 
Tomatoes 
The crops to be grown consist of cotton, rice, spring wheat, winter wheat, alfalfa, 
maize, tomatoes, melons, and pasture. With the exception ofwinter wheat, all crops are 
grown in the Summer, planted in April and May and harvested in the late Summer or Fall. 
There is an overlap, however, in Spring and Fall with the winter wheat rotation for labor and 
water requirements. As alfalfa is commonly grown in rotation with both cotton and wheat, 
two constraints were placed to require a 3 year cotton 2 year alfalfa rotation and a 3 year rice 1 
year alfalfa rotation, corresponding to common field practices. 
For labor it is assumed that there are 550 workers on the farm who are able to work 22 
days per month resulting in 12,100 man days oflabor available in a given month·. Labor 
requirements rise significantly during the periods of planting and harvest, particularly for 
cotton. The estimated total labor requirement for cotton for a growing season is 93 days per 
hectare, much of this being required for the hand harvesting of the crop. In practice, this 
results in a great deal of extra labor being allocated to the state farm for cotton planting and 
harvest as 'extra' household labor available on the state farm is mobilized during this period. 
State farm children are generally expected to work in the fields during planting and harvest, 
while urban and township students are also mobilized during the Fall and taken to the state 
farms to aid with the harvest. To account for this increase in labor availability, the right hand 
side constraint on labor is increased by 50% for the planting months ofApril, May, and for 
-

the harvest months of September and October. 
• This level of labor corresponds to that reported during field interviews. 
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In addition to extra labor supplied by other household members and imported student 
labor, we also assume that it is possible to purchase additional day labor at a price of $4.00 
per day which was the daily wage reported during field interviews. However, the availability 
of extra farm labor is limited. As a result we have limited the amount that the farm can 
purchase to a total of an additional supply of 12,100 man days, which is the equivalent of an 
additional month oflabor availability for the farm, or 12% of the total available labor supply 
for the farm during the growing season. This assumption is reasonable as there is a fair 
degree of labor traded both formally and informally between farms. 
Results 
Table 4 shows the optimal cropping pattern for the initial run of the model using 
domestic prices for all farm inputs and output. It can be seen from the table that in the initial 
model formulation, the farm will grow 500 ha. of winter wheat. The farm will also plant 244 
ha. to cotton, 554 ha. to rice, and 185 ha. to alfalfa. In this formulation no area is planted to 
spring wheat or maize. The allowable increase for these crops is 68.83 and 43.51 respectively 
which means that the gross margin for these crops would have to increase by this much before 
they would start to be planted on the representative farm. Finally, the reader will recall that a 
maximum area constraint was placed on high output price melons and tomatoes; as these 
constraints are both binding, the allowable increase for these variables is infinity. 
Table 4. Initial model Results: Cropping Pattern Using Domestic Prices 
Crop Hectares	 Obj. Fnctn. Allowable Allowable
 
Value Increase Decrease
 
Cotton	 244 564 27 26 
•Spring Wheat	 0 244 44 Infinity 
Winter Wheat 500 279 Infinity 14	 ,.." 
79 . Rice	 554 856 144 
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Alfalfa 185 218 47 431 
Maize 0 279 69 Infinity 
Melon- High Output Price 200 511 Infinity 197 
Melon- Low Output Price 0 256 58 Infinity 
Tomato- High Output Price 50 497 Infinity 187 
Tomato~ Low Output Price 0 249 61 Infinity 
Pasture 269 20 34 19 
Values for the allowable increase or decrease of objective function values in the last 
two columns of Table 4 indicate that model results are relatively robust. The objective 
function value for rice (presently 856) would have to increase by 144 or decrease by 79 before 
there would be a change in the existing cropping pattern. Since the constraints for winter 
wheat, and high output price melons and tomatoes are binding, the allowable increase for 
these crops is infinity. The allowable decrease for these crops however is substantial, which 
indicates that there would have to be a substantial change in either price or yield to alter 
model results. The allowable decrease for winter wheat however is only 14. As this crop 
competes for both water and labor in the spring and fall, a slightly different assumption about 
the productivity of this crop may produce a different result. 
Interestingly, the model results for cotton are relatively sensitive. With an objective 
function value of564, the allowable increase is 27, and decrease only 26. This means that 
with only a slight change in yield or price received, cotton area would change. An increase in 
yield only slightly better than the assumed 2.3 ton/ha would result in greater areas planted to 
cotton. 
In order to analyze this result further, the objective function value of cotton was 
increased beyond the allowable increase to 591 from its initial value of 564 resulting in an 
­
increase in the area planted of 12% (from 244 to 274 ha.). By calculating a simple arc 
elasticity it was found that the implied supply elasticity for cotton was 2.4 at this level of 
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production. Subsequent pennutations of the model were run further increasing and decreasing 
the objective function value according to allowable ranges to estimate a supply curve for 
cotton, and to evaluate how the supply elasticity would change with further alterations of the 
objective function value. For all model results the supply response elasticity was greater than 
1 indicating that, at least under the parameters specified by the model, area planted to cotton is 
very responsive to changes in price. It is also interesting to note that the arc elasticity value 
calculated between the existing domestic price and the estimated border price was 2.55, which 
indicates that were the output price for cotton to be raised to a level at or near the border price, 
there would be incentives to expand the area planted to cotton significantly. A step function 
showing the supply response for cotton is contained below in Figure 1. 
Price 
1,000 
500 
300 600 
A rea 
Figure 1. Cotton Supply Response Function 
Interestingly, the results obtained from the initial fonnulation of the model differ 
rather significantly from existing cropping practices on state farms. Results from field 
interviews indicated that commonly, 2/3 of land on the state farm will be devoted to the ­
production of cotton and grain with this area being split nearly evenly between the two crops. 
One third of total area will be sown to cotton, and one third to grain, be it rice or spring wheat, 
16
 
with the remaining third of the total area being composed of an assortment of other crops. For 
the case of rice, model results are similar to existing practices. 554 ha. planted to rice is 
roughly equivalent to 1/3 of planted area. The area planted to cotton however is significantly 
less in the model results than in existing practices. This result confirms the hypothesis that 
cotton suffers from a discriminatory output price policy. Or put another way, in the absence 
of a state procurement order for cotton, under existing price structures producers would have 
incentives to grow significantly less cotton than at present. 
Programming Results Using Border/Shadow Prices for Farm Inputs and Output 
In order to evaluate the effects ofa liberalization program, the model was rerun using 
border and shadow price values as described above. The technical coefficients related to 
fertilizer application rates and labor requirements remain the same. It is worth noting 
however, that for this permutation, water was added as a cost variable in the objective 
function at a price of 3.33$11,000m3 which is the unit cost estimated by Uzbek ministry 
officials that would cover state expenditures for the provision of irrigation water. 
Table 5 shows the model results using border and shadow prices. For ease of 
comparison, the results of the initial formulation using domestic prices have been placed next 
to the border price model results, demonstrating that cropping patterns change significantly 
Table 5. Model Results Using Border and Shadow Prices 
Border Price Initial 
Formulation Formulatio Change 
n 
Crop Hectares Hectares 
Cotton 458 244 +214 -

Spring Wheat 0 0 0 
Winter Wheat 500 500 0 
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Rice 488 554 -66 
Alfalfa 305 185 +120 
Maize 0 0 0 
Melon- High Output Price 200 200 0 
Melon- Low Output Price 0 0 0 
Tomato- High Output Price 50 50 0 
Tomato- Low Output Price 0 0 0 
Pasture 0 269 -269 
using border prices. We can see that the area planted to cotton has nearly doubled from 244 
ha. in the initial formulation to 458 ha. in the formulation using border and shadow prices. 
The acreage planted to rice has decreased from 554 ha. in the initial formulation to 488 ha. in 
this formulation. Area planted to alfalfa has increased from 185 ha. to 305 ha. This, however, 
is due to the constraint which requires that alfalfa be planted as a rotation 2 years in a 5 year 
cropping cycle with cotton. Areas planted to high output price melons and tomatoes do not 
change, remaining constant at 200 and 50 ha respectively. However, the area devoted to 
fallow pasture has decreased significantly from 269 ha. to 0 ha. in this formulation. This is an 
understandable result since generally the return using border and shadow prices for all crops is 
higher than the return using domestic prices, this would result in less land being left for 
pasture. 
It is also worth noting that the cropping pattern in this formulation of the model far 
more closely resembles existing cropping patterns than does the initial model formulation that 
uses domestic prices. This result is very significant. For from this we can conclude that 
.. 
present cropping patterns potentially represent an optimal use of agricultural resources for the ... 
economy at large though producers would not voluntarily choose this crop mix under current 
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state detennined prices. An important caveat should be included in this statement: This result 
also assumes that supplies of irrigation water to the producer are the same as those in the 
model, which would not necessarily be the case if water charges were imposed. 
What this result also demonstrates is that if state interventions into the agricultural 
sector were eliminated, cropping patterns might not change significantly from what they are at 
present. Certainly if pricing policy were only changed for a single commodity, the resulting 
change in cropping pattern would not correspond to those obtained in this pennutation of the 
model. Nevertheless, caveats notwithstanding, this is a significant result. For if the cropping 
pattern in the border price model resembles existing cropping patterns it is possible to 
hypothesize that in the event of the elimination of state intervention in the agricultural sector, 
there may not be significant changes in cropping patterns and hence production, even though 
the radically different prices imply very different distributions of costs and benefits. 
This fonnulation of the model yields another interesting result. It is commonly argued 
that significant transfers are occurring out of the Uzbek agricultural sector due to state pricing 
policies. If this is the case, then this should be reflected in an increase in the value of the 
objective function for the model using border price values. However, this did not occur. In 
fact, the value of the objective function using border and shadow price values for farm factors 
is actually 0.5% less at 520,923, than the fonnulation using domestic prices, which has a 
value of 523,298. This result indicates that taxes placed on producers in the fonn of 
suppressive output price policies are being offset by subsidies on farm inputs, and indicates 
that if all taxes and subsidies are eliminated, there would not be a big change in net farm 
income. 
As a brief experiment, an additional pennutation of the border price fonnulation of the 
model was run which did not require producers to pay the economic price of $3.33$/1,000 m3 
-

of irrigation water. The value of the objective function for this pennutation of the model was 
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639,562 or, 22% greater than the value of the objective function for the initial fonnulation 
using domestic prices. A summary of these differences in contained in Table 6. This result 
Table 6. Changes in Objective Function Values 
Objective Function 
Value 
Percent 
Change 
Initial Fonnulation- Domestic 
Prices 
523,298 
2nd Fonnulation 
Border Prices- Cost for Water 
520,923 - 0.5% 
2nd Fonnulation 
Border Prices­ 'Free' Water 
639,562 +22% 
demonstrates that producers are benefiting from a substantial subsidy by not having to pay for 
irrigation water. However, ifrefonns in water policy were also implemented such that it 
would be necessary for producers to pay for the shadow value of irrigation water, results from 
this model indicate that the level offann income would not increase but may actually decrease 
slightly. In sum, the results from these pennutations of the model indicate that if the border 
and shadow price values for all fann inputs and output are taken into account, it is not 
possible to conclude that fann income would invariably increase were price distortions in the 
agriculture sector to be reduced. 
In addition to the results obtained for changes in cropping pattern and fann income 
resulting from contrasts in domestic and border prices, the programming model also yielded a 
number of interesting results with respect to the supply of irrigation water and its economic 
value. The first is that changes in water availability have a significant effect on model results. 
With an abundant supply ofwater the optimal cropping pattern shifts toward rice. However, 
at lower levels ofwater availability the optimal cropping pattern shifts away from rice and 
toward cotton and other crops. Interestingly, this result confonns neatly to Rybzcynski's 
...
 
theorem which states that if the endowment ofa given factor increases, in this case water, then 
the production of the good that uses this factor more intensely will increase. For the 
20 
programming model, with greater endowments ofwater, the production of rice experiences 
the greatest increase in production. And ofcourse conversely, with decreases in the 
endowment ofwater, the production of rice decreases proportionately more than other crops. 
This result also demonstrates that despite the fact that rice may have a higher gross 
margin than cotton and other grains, in the event that there are inadequate supplies ofwater, 
(a common occurrence), rice is no longer the optimal crop to plant. In the future it is likely 
that smaller, not greater, quantities of irrigation water will be available to producers in 
Karakalpakstan. As such, rice may then continue to be grown in certain areas of the Amu 
Darya delta in Karakalpakstan where there is adequate water and where rice has been grown 
for centuries. Nevertheless, as in the discussion concerning horticulture crops, it is likely that 
a more effective development strategy is to devote scant water resources to crops which are 
less water consumptive than rice". Hence, similar to the model results regarding horticultural 
crops, research into cropping alternatives to rice could prove to be very useful in improving 
the effective availability ofwater resources in the region. 
The second major result with respect to irrigation water is that the values for the 
marginal value product ofwater obtained from the model clearly indicate that a modest charge 
could be imposed for water without creating incentives for producers to shift their cropping 
patterns. This is not a surprising result. Without irrigation, agriculture of any sort in 
Karakalpakstan and Uzbekistan is almost impossible. As a result it is not surprising that the 
marginal value product of this input has a significantly positive value. 
However, while the marginal value product of irrigation water may be positive, it is 
not clear that changes in water policy in Karakalpakstan could be easily implemented in the 
short run. Water pricing is likely to be the most efficient policy mechanism by which to 
achieve more efficient uses ofwater in Karakalpakstan and Uzbekistan. However, a 
-

" It is worth noting that this position was also confIrmed by a rice researcher during a fIeld interview who state 
that indeed if water were available, then rice could be grown effectively and profitably, but also went on to state 
that in the event that inadequate water were available, rice would not be an effective crop for producers. 
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significant amount of additional social research and technical assistance would likely be 
required before such policy refonns could effectively be implemented. 
Conclusions 
This study has provided an overview of the contemporary policy envirorunent for 
agricultural producers in Karakalpakstan and has explored the implications of refonns in 
agricultural price policy and water management. It appears that a cotton centered growth 
strategy could be effective over the medium run. If envirorunental factors related to water 
quality and availability are taken into consideration, it quickly becomes clear that 
Karakalpakstan's emphasis on rice production is an artifact of output and input price 
distortions and does not represent an efficient use of resources. The results for the 
representative farm demonstrate that if all price distortions are eliminated there may not be a 
significant change in cropping patterns than those currently in practice. Results also 
demonstrate that refonns in water policy could be implemented without inducing producers to 
significantly alter their cropping pattern. 
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Glossary of Notation for Model Variables 
Variable Explication 
COT Cotton Grow I hectare ofCotton 
SWHT Spring Wheat " " Spring Wheat 
WWHT Winter Wheat " " Winter Wheat 
RIC Rice " " Rice 
ALF Alfalfa " " Alfalfa 
MAZ Maize " " Maize 
MELI High Output Price Melons " " Melons 
MEL2 Low Output Price Melons " " " 
TOMI High Output Price Melons " " Tomatoes 
TOM2 Low Output Price Melons " " " 
PAS Pasture " " Pasture 
NIT Nitrogenous Fertilizer Cost per ton ofnitrogenous fertilizer 
(Ammonium Sulfate) 
PHO Phosphate Fertilizer Cost per ton ofphosphate fertilizer 
(Ammonium Phosphate) 
KCL Potassium Fertilizer Cost per ton ofpotassium fertilizer 
(Muriate of Potash) 
MNR Manure Cost per ton ofmanure 
ALTAI Primary Tillage Hourly cost ofoperation; large tractor 
MTZ Secondary Tillage/ ; light tractor 
Cultivation 
SWATH Hay Harvest " " ; swather 
COMBINE Combine Harvest " " ; combine harvester 
DAYLAB Day Labor Cost of Labor per day 
DLMAR Day Labor May Buy labor in month ofMay 
DLMAY Day Labor March " " March 
DLAPR Day Labor April " " April 
DLMAY Day Labor May ,. " May 
DLJUN Day Labor June " " June 
DLJUL Day Labor July " " July 
DLAUG Day Labor August " " August 
DLSEP 
DLOCT 
Day Labor September 
Day Labor October 
" " September
.. .. October 
-WAT Buy water Buy 1,000 cubic meters of water 
(10 vertical centimeters) ... 
Initial Formulation of the Linear Programming Model 
OBJECTIVE FUNCTION: 
MAX 564COT + 244SWHT + 279WWHT + 856RIC + 218ALF + 279MAZ + 
511MELI + 256MEL2 + 497TOMI + 249TOM2 + 20PAS­
110NIT - 172PHO - 103KCL - 4.1MNR­
9.8ALTAI - 3.8MTZ - 7.5SWATH - II.2COMBINE ­
4DAYLAB 
SUBJECT TO CONSTRAINTS: 
SEASONAL LABOR CONSTRAINTS 
ROW 2: LABOR CONSTRAINT TOTAL 
93COT + 12SWHT + 63RIC + lO.4ALF + 30MAZ + 9WWHT + 63MELI + 
63MEL2 + 53TOMI + 53TOM2 + .8PAS <= 120000 
ROW 3: LABOR CONSTRAINT MARCH 
lWWHT + ISWHT + .IPAS <= 12100 
ROW 4: LABOR CONSTRAINT APRIL 
15COT + 2SWHT + 9RIC + 2ALF + 15MAZ + 2WWHT + 9MELI + 
9MEL2 + 5TOMI + 5TOM2 + .IPAS - IDLAPR <= 12100 
ROW 5: LABOR CONSTRAINT MAY 
15COT + 2SWHT + 18RIC + 2ALF + 9MAZ + 2WWHT + 9MELI + 9MEL2 + 
8TOMI + 8TOM2 + .1PAS - IDLMAY <= 15125 
ROW 6: LABOR CONSTRAINT JUNE 
8COT+ ISWHT+7RIC+ lALF + 3MAZ + 9MELI + 9MEL2 + 6TOMI + 
6TOM2 + .IPAS - IDLJUN <= 12100 
ROW 7: LABOR CONSTRAINT JULY , 
, 
I 
8COT+ ISWHT+ 3RIC + lALF+3MAZ+9MELI + 9MEL2 + llTOMI + 
I1TOM2 + .IPAS - IDLJUL <= 12100 
.. 
11 
ROW 8: LABOR CONSTRAINT AUGUST 
8COT + ISWHT + 3RIC + lALF + 3MAZ + 9MELI + 9MEL2 + 11TOMI + 
11 TOM2 + .IPAS - IDLAUG <= 12100 
ROW 9: LABOR CONSTRAINT SEPTEMBER 
25COT + 2SWHT + 12RIC + 1.4ALF + 8MAZ + lWWHT + 9MELI + 9MEL2 
+ 8TOMI + 8TOM2 + .1PAS - IDLSEP <= 15125 
ROW 10: LABOR CONSTRAINT OCTOBER 
14COT + 2SWHT + llRIC + 2ALF + 9MAZ + 3WWHT + 9MELI + 9MEL2 + 
4TOMI + 4TOM2 + .IPAS - IDLOCT <= 15125 
ROW 11-12: BUY LABOR CONSTRAINT 
DLAPR + DLMAY + DLJUN + DLJUL + DLAUG + DLSEP + DLOCT ­
DAYLAB<=O 
DAYLAB <= 12100 
WATER CONTRAINTS 
ROW 13: WATER CONSTRAINT TOTAL 
16COT + 9SWHT + 35RIC + 9ALF + 9WWHT + 17.3MAZ + 14MELI + 
14MEL2 + 24TOMI + 24TOM2 <= 50000 
ROW 14: WATER CONSTRAINT MARCH 
2COT + 2ALF + lMAZ + 1WWHT <= 6500 
ROW 15: WATER CONSTRAINT APRIL 
2COT + 2SWHT + 10RIC + 2ALF + 2MAZ + 2MELI + 2MEL2 + 2WWHT + 
4TOMI + 4TOM2 <= 8500 
• 
ROW 16: WATER CONSTRAINT MAY 
-

2COT + ISWHT + 4.5RIC + lALF + 2.3MAZ + 2MELI + 2MEL2 + 2WWHT 
+ 4TOMI + 4TOM2 <= 8500 
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ROW 17: WATER CONSTRAINT JUNE 
2COT + 2SWHT + 4.5RIC + lALF + 2MAZ + 3MELl + 3MEL2 + 4TOMl + 
4TOM2 <= 6500 
ROW 18: WATER CONSTRAINT JULY 
2.5COT + 2SWHT + 6.5RIC + lALF + 3MAZ + 3MELl + 3MEL2 + 5TOMl + 
5TOM2 <= 6500 
ROW 19: WATER CONSTRAINT AUGUST 
2.5COT + ISWHT + 6.5RIC + lALF + 3MAZ + 2MELI + 2MEL2 + 5TOMl + 
5TOM2 <= 6500 
ROW 20: WATER CONSTRAINT SEPTEMBER 
1.5COT+ ISWHT+3RIC+ IALF+4MAZ+2MELl +2MEL2+ lWWHT+ 
2TOM1 + 2TOM2 <= 6500 
ROW 21 : WATER CONSTRAINT OCTOBER 
1.5COT + 3WWHT <= 6500 
ROW 22-23: LAND CONSTRAINT 
COT + SWHT + RIC + ALF + MAZ + MELI + MEL2 + TOMI + TOM2 + 
PAS <= 1500 
WWHT<=500 
FERTILIZER CONSTRAINTS 
ROW 24: NITROGEN CONSTRAINT 
.42COT + .62RIC + .24SWHT + .24WWHT + .27ALF + .3MAZ + .16MELl + 
.16MEL2 + .IITOMI + .1 1TOM2 - NIT <= 0 
ROW 25: PHOSPHATE CONSTRAINT 
.36COT + .3IRIC + .2ISWHT + .21WWHT + .21ALF +.2MAZ + .18MELI + 
.18MEL2 - PHO <= 0 
IV 
ROW 26: POTASSIUM CONSTRAINT 
.2COT + .32RIC + .09SWHT + .09WWHT - KCL <= 0 
ROW 27: MANURE CONSTRAINT 
, 
20COT + 15RIC + 15SWHT + 15WWHT + 10MAZ + .6MELI + .6MEL2 + 
2.4TOMI + 2.4TOM2 - MNR <= 0 
ROW 28-31: MACHINERY CONSTRAINTS 
ROW 28: PRIMARY TILLAGE CONSTRAINT 
4COT + 6RIC + 1.5SWHT + 1.5WWHT + 3ALF + 2MAZ + 4MELI + 4MEL2 
+ 2TOMI + 2TOM2 - ALTAI <= 0 
ROW 29: SECONDARY TILLAGE AND CULTIVATION CONSTRAINT 
8.5COT + 3RIC + 2.7SWHT+ 2.7WWHT + 2.6ALF + 2.75MAZ + IlMELl + 
IlMEL2 + 7.5TOMI + 7.5TOM2 - MTZ <= 0 
ROW 30: HAY HARVEST CONSTRAINT 
6.25ALF - SWATH <= 0 
ROW 31: COMBINE HARVESTER CONSTRAINT 
2.75RIC + 1.5SWHT + 1.5WWHT + 1.75MAZ - COMBINE <= 0 
ROW 32-33: COTTON ALFALFA ROTATION 
COT - 1.5ALF <= 0 
RIC - 3ALF <= 0 
ROW 34-35: MELON1 AND TOMAT01 CONSTRAINT 
• 
MELI <=200 
-TOMI <=50 
v 
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